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Abstract
This paper compares the economic questions addressed by instrumental variables estimators
with those addressed by structural approaches. We discuss Marschak's Maxim: estimators
should be selected on the basis of their ability to answer well-posed economic problems with
minimal assumptions. A key identifying assumption that allows structural methods to be more
informative than IV can be tested with data and does not have to be imposed.
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11 Introduction
The primary question regarding the choice of an empirical approach to analyzing economic data
should be What economic question does the analyst seek to answer? Explicit economic models
make it easier to formulate and answer economic questions. Advocates of atheoretical approaches
to analyzing economic data appeal to randomization as an ideal and invoke IV (or matching or
regression discontinuity designs) as a surrogate for randomization. However, even perfectly executed
randomizations do not answer all questions of economic interest. There are important examples
where structural models produce more information about preferences than experiments.1
A valid instrument is not guaranteed to identify parameters of economic interest when responses
to choices vary among individuals, and these variations inuence choices taken.2 Dierent valid
instruments answer dierent questions.3 The sign of the IV estimator can be dierent from that of
the true causal eect.4
No one trained in economics can doubt the value of credible explicit economic models in inter-
preting economic data. They are designed to answer a variety of well-posed economic questions and
to be invariant to classes of policy interventions.5 The problem with this approach is that after 60
years of experience with tting structural models on a variety of data sources, empirical economists
have come to appreciate the practical diculty in identifying, and precisely estimating, the full
array of structural parameters that answer the large variety of policy questions contemplated by
the Cowles Commission economists | the fathers of structural estimation.6
Proponents of IV are less ambitious in the range of questions they seek to answer. The method
often gains precision by asking narrower questions. The problem that plagues the IV approach is
that the questions it answers are usually dened as probability limits of estimators and not by well-
1See Heckman (1992, 2008) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b).
2See Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) for a comparison of what dierent approaches identify. Matching rules out
selection on unobservables. Regression discontinuity estimators identify, at best, local eects.
3Building on this point, Heckman, Schmierer, and Urzua (2008) develop and apply nonparametric tests for the
presence of heterogenous responses to treatment on which agents make choices.
4Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2008). This is true even under the \monotonicity" conditions of Imbens and
Angrist (1994), as generalized to the vector case by Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil
(2006) unless one conditions on instruments correctly.
5See the essays in Koopmans (1950). See also Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a).
6Pencavel (1986) summarizes structural estimates of taxes on labor supply and reports absurd estimates, including
one due to Jerry Hausman, which implied a negative marginal propensity to consume goods out of income. These
and other estimates, reported in the literature some 20 years ago, fueled the ight of many empirical economists from
structural models.
2formulated economic problems. Unspecied \eects" replace clearly dened economic parameters
as the objects of empirical interest.
As noted by Marschak (1953), there is a middle ground. Marschak's Maxim emphasizes that
one should solve well-posed economic problems with minimal assumptions. Marschak noted that
for many problems of policy analysis, it is not necessary to identify fully specied structural models
with parameters that are invariant to classes of policy modications | the goal of structural analysis
as conceived by the Cowles pioneers and successor generations of structural economists.7 All that
is required to conduct many policy analyses or to answer many well-posed economic questions are
combinations of the structural parameters that are often much easier to identify than the individual
parameters themselves.8
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005) bridge the structural and IV literatures. They develop
an economically interpretable parameter | the marginal treatment eect (MTE) | which is a
marginal willingness to pay for the benet of treatment for persons at well-dened margins of choice.
It is invariant to a class of policy modications. The MTE can be identied by local variation in
instruments. They show how dierent instrumental variables weight the MTE dierently. These
weights need not be positive for all values of the argument of the MTE.9 For classes of well-posed
economic questions, it is possible, under the conditions given in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), to
fashion functions of instruments that answer well-posed economic questions. Alternatively, it is
possible to use an estimated MTE and construct weights to estimate economically interpretable
parameters. This approach is unusual in the standard IV literature, which traditionally denes the
parameter of interest to be an \eect" identied by an instrument.
Many economists follow Imbens and Angrist (1994) and interpret IV as identifying a weighted
average of the gains to persons induced to change their choice (or state) by a change in the instru-
ment. Imbens and Angrist work with a two choice model. Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006,
2008) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) extend this analysis to an ordered choice model and to
7Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a) dene structural models precisely following the seminal denition of Hurwicz
(1962). These discussions formalize ideas in Marschak (1953).
8See the discussion in Heckman (2008) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b).
9MTE was introduced into the literature in the context of a selection model by Bj orklund and Mott (1987). The
Local Average Treatment Eect (LATE) (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) is a discretized version of the MTE. The weights
for special cases were derived by Yitzhaki (1989) and applied by Imbens and Angrist (1994). Those weights are always
non-negative. Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005, 2007b) and Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) generalize the
Imbens-Angrist-Yitzhaki analysis to the case of multiple instruments without restrictions and show how IV weights
can be non-positive over certain intervals, but that they must integrate to one.
3general unordered choice models.10 This paper develops the unordered case further and gives a
precise characterization of the generalization of the MTE that is appropriate for this case.
The original Imbens-Angrist intuition applies, but in general unordered choice models, agents
attracted into a state by a change in an instrument come from many origin states, so there are many
margins of choice. Structural models can identify the gains arising from these separate margins.
This is a dicult task for IV without invoking structural assumptions. Structural models can also
identify the fraction of persons induced into a state coming from each origin state. IV alone cannot.
For some economic questions, these are unimportant distinctions. For others, they are crucial.
For specicity, consider an analysis of the GED program. The GED is a test by which high school
dropouts can exam certify to be the equivalents of ordinary high school graduates. Heckman,
LaFontaine, and Rodr guez (2008) show that the presence of a GED program induces some persons
to drop out of high school. It also induces some persons who would remain dropouts to exam
certify. Within this context we ask: What are the wage benets for those induced to take the GED
from the dropout state? For those induced to drop out of high school? What proportion of persons
induced to take a GED come from each of the other states?
IV cannot answer these questions except under structural assumptions. It can identify the mean
gross gain to the GED for those induced to take it, compared to the next best alternative. This is
a weighted average of the eects from each possible origin state that the structural approach can
separately identify. In the IV approach, when there are multiple origin states, the weights on the
individual eects cannot be estimated without using structural methods. As shown in Heckman
and Vytlacil (2007b), IV needs to be supplemented with explicit choice theory to answer many
interesting questions, including questions of economic welfare regarding introduction of policies as
well as distributional questions such as the percentage of persons harmed by a policy.
This paper demonstrates these points. We rst establish a precise framework for discussing IV,
and relate it to economic models.
10Angrist and Imbens (1995) propose an ordered choice version of their 1994 paper. As shown by Heckman,
Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006), their proposed extension has unsatisfactory features which can be removed by a careful
reformulation of the IV method applied to the ordered choice model. See also Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b).
42 The Choice Model and Assumptions
Following Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006, 2008) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b), consider
the following model with multiple choices and associated multiple outcome states. Let J denote
the agent's choice set, where J contains a nite number of elements. For example, J enumerates
possible schooling states (e.g., GED, high school dropout, high school graduate). The value to the
agent of choosing j 2 J is
Rj(Zj) = #j(Zj)   Vj; (1)
where Zj are the agent's observed characteristics that aect the utility from choosing j, and Vj is
the unobserved shock to the agent's utility from choice j. We sometimes write Rj for Rj(Zj) to
simplify notation. Let Z denote the random vector containing all unique elements of fZjgj2J. We
write Rj(Z) for Rj(Zj), leaving implicit the condition that Rj() only depends on the elements of
Z that are contained in Zj. Let Dj be a variable indicating whether the agent would choose j if





1 if Rj  Rk 8 k 2 J
0 otherwise:
Array the Dj into a vector D. Let Y be the outcome that would be observed if the agent faced





where Yj is a potential outcome observed only if option j is chosen. Yj is determined by
Yj = j(Xj;Uj);
where Xj is a vector of the agent's observed characteristics and Uj is an unobserved random vector.
Let X denote the random vector containing all unique elements of fXjgj2J. (Z;X;D;Y ) is assumed
to be observed by the analyst.12
11Below, we invoke conditions so that ties, Rj = Rk for j 6= k, occur with probability zero.
12Depending on the choice model, Z may or may not include the X. For example, in a Roy model of schooling under
perfect certainty (e.g. Willis and Rosen, 1979), X would be among the Z. In models of schooling under uncertainty






This is the traditional representation of the decision process that if choice j is optimal, choice j is
better than the \next best" option:
Dj = 1 () Rj  RJnj:
Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006, 2008) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) show that this
simple, well-known, representation is the key intuition for understanding how instrumental variables
estimate the eect of a given choice versus the \next best" alternative. IV is a weighted average
of the eects for people induced into a choice from dierent margins. Analogous to the denition
of RJ, we dene RJ(z) to be the maximum obtainable value given choice set J when instruments




Following the analysis in Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006, 2008) and Heckman and Vytlacil
(2007b), we assume:
(A-1) The distribution of (fVjgj2J) is continuous.13
(A-2) f(Vj;Uj)gj2J is independent of Z conditional on X.
(A-3) E j Yjj < 1 for all j 2 J.
(A-4) Pr(Dj = 1 j X) > 0 for all j 2 J:
In addition, we assume an exclusion restriction that requires some additional notation.14 Let
Z[ l] denote all elements of Z except for the lth component. We assume
(e.g. Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro, 2005, Cunha and Heckman, 2007 and Urzua, 2008) innovations in X unknown
at the time schooling decisions are made would not be in Z. The key condition on Z is given in Assumption (A-2)
below.
13Absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure on
Q
j2J<.
14We work here with exclusion restrictions in part for ease of exposition. By adapting the analysis of Cameron
and Heckman (1998) and Heckman and Navarro (2007), one can modify our analysis for the case of no exclusion
restrictions if Z contains a sucient number of continuous variables and there is sucient variation in the #k function
across k.
6(A-5) For each j 2 J, their exists at least one element of Z, say Z[l], such that the distribution of
#j(Zj) conditional on (X;Z[ l]) is continuous.
With these assumptions, one can generalize the analysis of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001,
2005) to the unordered case. Assumptions (A-1) and (A-2) imply that Rj 6= Rk (with probability
1) for j 6= k, so that argmaxj2JfRjg is unique (with probability 1). Assumption (A-2) assures the
existence of an instrument. Assumption (A-3) is required for mean treatment parameters to be well
dened. It also allows one to integrate to the limit and to produce well-dened means. Assumption
(A-4) requires that at least some individuals participate in each choice for all X. Assumption
(A-5) imposes the requirement that one be able to independently vary the index for the given value
function. It imposes a type of exclusion restriction, that for any j 2 J, Z contains an element
such that (i) it is contained in Zj; (ii) it is not contained in any Zk for k 6= j, and (iii) #j() is a
nontrivial function of that element conditional on all other regressors.15
In a series of papers, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001, 2005, 2007b), develop the method of
local instrumental variables (LIV) to estimate the marginal treatment eect (MTE) for the case of
binary choices. We now dene and interpret the MTE and LIV in the case of general unordered
choices.
3 Interpreting Local Instrumental Variables in the Unordered Case
We dene local instrumental variables (LIV) using a variable that shifts people toward (or against)
choice j by operating only on Rj(Zj). LIV identies an average marginal return to j vs. the next
best alternative across persons.16 However, without further assumptions, LIV will not decompose
the average marginal return into its component parts corresponding to the eects for persons
induced into j from each of the possible origin states.
To see this, consider a three outcome case, J = f1;2;3g. For concreteness, we pursue the
education example previously stated and let 1 be GED, 2 be high school dropout, and 3 be high
school graduate. Our results are more general but the three outcome case is easy to exposit.
In this section, we assume that Z1;Z2;Z3 are disjoint sets of regressors so Z = (Z1;Z2;Z3) but
15See Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) for additional discussion.
16See Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b).
7they are not necessarily statistically independent. We can easily relax this assumption but making
it simplies the notation. We condition on X and keep it implicit throughout the analysis of this
paper.17 In this notation,












= E (Y1D1 j Z) + E (Y2D2 j Z) + E (Y3D3 j Z):
E(Y jZ) and its components can be estimated from data on (Y;Z). IV is based on (3). From (2),
choices are generated by the following inequalities:
D1 = 1(R1  R2;R1  R3)
D2 = 1(R2  R1;R2  R3)
D3 = 1(R3  R1;R3  R2):
We dene the marginal change in Y with respect to Z1. IV methods are based on such types











where LIV is a function of z. In the case of three choices, there are two margins from which persons
can be attracted into or out of choice 1 by Z1.18
From local variations in Z1, one can recover the following combinations of parameters from the
17See Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) for a more general analysis.
18Recall that Z1 only aects the utility associated with choice 1.
8data on Y1D1:





































By similar reasoning, we can recover the following combination of parameters from the data on
Y2D2:






























From data on Y3D3, we obtain the following combination of parameters:













fY3;V3 V1;V3 V2 (y3;#3 (z3)   #1 (z1);v3   v2) d(v3   v2) dy3 :
(6)
Agents induced into 1 come from 2 and 3. There are two margins:
(R1 = R2) and (R1  R3) (margin of indierence between 1 and 2),
and
(R1 = R3) and (R1  R2) (margin of indierence between 1 and 3).
9Unaided, IV does not enable analysts to identify the returns at each of the dierent margins.
Instead, it identies a weighted average of returns. It does not identify the density of persons at
the various margins, i.e., the proportion of people induced into (or out of) 1 from each possible
alternative state by a change in the instrument.
Collecting terms and rewriting in more easily interpretable components, which generalize the




















Generalization of MTE for persons indierent
between 1 and 2, where choice 3 is dominated
z }| {
[E (Y1   Y2 j R1 (z1) = R2 (z2);R1 (z1)  R3 (z3))]Pr(R1 (z1) = R2 (z2);R1 (z1)  R3 (z3))
+[E (Y1   Y3 j R1 (z1) = R3 (z3);R1 (z1)  R2 (z2))]
| {z }
Generalization of MTE for persons indierent
between 1 and 3, where choice 2 is dominated








This is a weighted return to alternative 1 for persons coming from two separate margins: alternative
1 versus alternative 2, and alternative 1 versus alternative 3, i.e., the return to people induced into
1 from their next best choice. The weights are the proportion of people induced into 1 from each
margin. This combination of parameters can be identied from IV. The components of the sum
cannot be identied by IV without further assumptions. Note that it is possible that a group at one
margin gains while a group at another margin loses. IV only estimates a net eect, which might
be zero.
Notice that from representation (2.1) and the assumption that the Zj (jJ) are distinct, pairwise
monotonicity, an extension of the monotonicity assumption invoked by Imbens and Angrist (1994)
for the binary choice case, is satised.20 In the context of a model with multiple choices, pairwise
monotonicity means the same pattern of ow between any two states is experienced by everyone.
Thus, as Zj increases, there is a ow from i to j but not from j to i (or vice versa). From (1),
changing Z1 induces all persons to move in the same direction (i.e. from 1 to 2 or 2 to 1 but
not both, and from 1 to 3 or 3 to 1 but not both). Pairwise monotonicity does not rule out the
19Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) generalize the MTE to an ordered choice model. See also Heckman and
Vytlacil (2007b).
20This is dened as \uniformity" in Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006).
10possibility that a change in an instrument causes people to move in the direction from j to i but
to move away from the direction from k to i for j 6= k, and j;k 6= i.
By the chain rule, the derivative of Pr(D1 = 1 j Z) is:












Pr(R1 (z1) = R2 (z2);R1 (z1)  R3 (z3))






















E (Y1   Y2 j R1 (z1) = R2 (z2);R1 (z1)  R3 (z3))!12




The combination of terms can be identied by LIV from the data on (Y;D;Z).
The IV weights are:
!12 =




Pr(R1 (z1) = R2 (z2);R1 (z1)  R3 (z3))












Pr(R1 (z1) = R2 (z2);R1 (z1)  R3 (z3))





The weights can be identied from a structural discrete choice analysis.21 They cannot be identied
by an unaided instrumental variable analysis. Thus it is not possible to identify the component
21Conditions for nonparametric identication of the multinomial discrete choice model are presented in Matzkin
(1993, 1994). Conditions for nonparametric identication of the full choice model with outcomes are given in Heck-
man and Vytlacil (2007a, Appendix B). Conditions for identication of general dynamic discrete choice models are
presented in Abbring and Heckman (2007). Conditions for identication in multinomial models that do not require
\identication at innity" are given in Fox and Gandhi (2008).
11parts of (5) by LIV alone, i.e., one cannot separately identify the generalized MTEs:
E (Y1   Y2 j R1 (z1) = R2 (z2);R1 (z1)  R3 (z3))
and
E (Y1   Y3 j R1 (z1) = R3 (z3);R1 (z1)  R2 (z2));
unless one invokes \identication at innity" arguments or alternative arguments using local varia-
tion in regressors developed by Fox and Gandhi (2008).22 Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2009)
and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) develop classes of economically interpretable parameters that
do not require \identication at innity" and that can be identied using estimated marginal
treatment eects.
Using a structural model, one can estimate the components of (7) and determine the ow into
(or out of) state 1 from all sources. We illustrate this point in Section 5. First we consider what
standard IV estimates.
4 What does standard IV estimate?
To see what standard IV estimates, consider the following linear-in-schooling model of earnings
that receives much attention in the literature in labor economics.23 Let Y denote log earnings and
write S as years of schooling. The model writes
Y =  + S + U (11)
22See Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) who show how to vary Z3 or Z2 to eectively shut down one margin of
choice. Specically, for any xed Z1 = z1; if limZ2! ~ Z2 R2(Z2) !  1 and limZ3! ~ Z3 R3(Z3) !  1 where ~ Z2 and ~ Z3
represent limit sets, then we can identify, respectively, the gains at the 3 ! 1 margin in the limit set, and the gains
in the 2 ! 1 margin in the limit set. These assumptions require that one can vary Z2 and Z3 to shut down one or
the other margin of choice. Under these assumptions and some additional mild regularity assumptions, the structural
approach can identify distributions of (Y1   Y2) and (Y2   Y3) as we demonstrate in the example in Section 5 of this
paper. \Identication at innity" is a model-specic misnomer. It is an assumption that there are dierent sets each
with non-negligible probability such that the probabilities of attaining various outcome states are arbitrarily close
to one. \Identication at innity" assumptions are justied naturally in truncated regression models. See Heckman
(1987).






and Y is dened as in Section 2. It is interpreted in this section as an approximation to the general
model presented in Section 2. S is assumed to be correlated with U, and  is a random variable
that may be statistically dependent on S. The model of Section 2 does not, in general, imply (11).
Indeed, there is much empirical evidence against model (11).24 An analysis of what IV estimates
when linearity in S is imposed as an approximation, even though it may be inappropriate, is an
interesting exercise because linearity is so often invoked.






estimates. We do this by decomposing IV
Z1 into components analogous to the decomposition pro-
duced by Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006, 2008) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b). The
Appendix presents the derivation of the following decomposition of IV into our pairwise general-
24See Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) for discussions of this model and various justications for it. Heckman,
Layne-Farrar, and Todd (1996) present evidence against linearity of the earnings function in terms of years of
schooling.
















Generalized MTE (2 ! 1) not identied from LIV
z }| {
E (Y1   Y2 j V2   V1 = v2   v1;#2 (z2)   #3 (z3)  V2   V3)
#2(Z2) #3(Z3);V2 V1 (#2 (z2)   #3 (z3);v2   v1)
| {z }
weight identied from discrete
choice analysis

















Generalized MTE(3 ! 1) not identied from LIV
z }| {
E (Y1   Y3 j V3   V1 = v3   v1;#3 (z3)   #2 (z2)  V3   V2)
#3(Z3) #2(Z2);V3 V1 (#3 (z3)   #2 (z2);v3   v1)
| {z }
weight identied from discrete
choice analysis











 #2(Z2) #3(Z3);V2 V1 (#2 (z2)   #3 (z3);v2   v1)

| {z }
weight identied from discrete
choice analysis







 #3(Z3) #2(Z2);V3 V1 (#3 (z3)   #2 (z2);v3   v1)

| {z }
weight identied from discrete
choice analysis
d(v3   v1) d(#3 (z3)   #2 (z2)):
IV identies a weighted average of gains to state 1 compared to the next best alternative which
may be 2 or 3. The two terms of the decomposition are dened as generalized MTEs and are
weighted averages of the gain of moving from state 2 to state 1 for persons on the margin of
indierence between 1 and 2 and for whom 2 is a better choice than 3 (the rst term) and the gain
of moving from 3 to 1 for persons on the margin of indierence between 1 and 3 and for whom 3
is a better choice than 2 (the second term).25
In the Appendix, we derive the weights on the generalized MTEs and show that they do not
sum to 1 even when normalized by the denominator. The mathematical reason for this result is
simple. The weights in the numerator do not sum to the weights in the denominator. The second
term in the denominator receives twice as much weight as the corresponding term in the numerator.
This is a consequence of the denition of S (12), which plays no role in the numerator term. Thus,
IV applied to the general model produces an arbitrarily weighted sum of generalized MTEs with
weights that do not sum to 1, and which, in general, places more weight on the rst generalized
25Since Z1 only aects R(Z1), it has no direct eect on the margin 2 ! 3.
14MTE term than on the second term, compared to the weights placed on the corresponding terms
in the denominator.26 Using IV alone, we cannot decompose (14) into its component parts, even
though the weights can be identied from discrete choice analysis.27;28
4.1 The Mincer Model
The Mincer (1974) model is a specialization of the general model discussed in Section 2 of this
paper that justies the precise functional form of equation (11).29 For this case, the weights in (14)
in the numerator and denominator are the same. The Mincer model is formulated in terms of log
earnings for Y1;Y2; and Y3:
Y2 = ln(1 + g) + Y1;
Y3 = ln(1 + g) + Y2 = 2ln(1 + g) + Y1;
26Thus \2" appears only in the denominator and not in the numerator.
27The structural model is nonparametrically identied under the conditions in Appendix B of Heckman and Vytlacil
(2007a).
28Decomposition (14) is not unique. It arises from decomposing Y into
Y = D1Y1 + D2Y2 + D3Y3
where we solve out D1 = 1   D2   D3, to obtain
Y = Y1 + D2(Y2   Y1) + D3(Y3   Y1):
We could also solve out D2 = 1   D1   D3 to obtain
Y = Y2 + D1(Y1   Y2) + D3(Y3   Y2)
or D3 = 1   D1   D2 to obtain
Y = Y3 + D1(Y1   Y3) + D2(Y2   Y3):
Each decomposition can be used to represent 
IV
Z1. For each decomposition, the leading terms on the right-hand
side, (Y1;Y2;Y3), respectively, are uncorrelated with Z1 by virtue of (A-2). Corresponding generalized MTEs can be
dened for each decomposition. Z1 aects the lower boundary of the opportunity set in
E(Y2   Y3jR(z2)  R(z1);R(z3)  R(z1)):
We choose the decomposition reported in the text for its greater interpretability.
29See Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) for a discussion of the Mincer Model and the powerful body of evidence
against it. Card (2001) provides one justication for functional form 11.
15where g is a growth factor for income that varies in the population. Earnings at each schooling














 1 E ( j V2   V1 = v2   v1;#2 (z2)   #3 (z3)  V2   V3)









 1 E ( j V3   V1 = v3   v1;#3 (z3)   #2 (z2)  V3   V2)





















In this case, the weights now sum to 1. The weights for the numerator term now are the same
as the weights for the denominator term. But again, unaided IV does not identify the component
parts of the term bundled in IV | the mean gains at each margin.30;31
5 An Example
It is instructive to summarize our analysis with an example. Consider a 3 choice model with as-
sociated outcomes. This corresponds to the GED, high school dropout and high school graduate
example that we have used throughout the paper. Under conditions presented in Heckman and Vyt-
lacil (2007a, Appendix B), the structural model is nonparametrically identied. A key assumption
in their proof is the \identication at innity" assumption previously discussed.32 This assumes
the ability to vary (Z1;Z2;Z3) freely and the existence of limit sets such that xing any two of
(Z1;Z2;Z3), one makes the Rj associated with Zj arbitrarily small.33
30An anonymous referee has correctly expressed the concern that in the case of an income-maximizing Mincer
model under perfect certainty, the general unordered model would not apply. Indeed, the decision problem is not well
dened. If g > r, the opportunity cost of funds, agents would choose the maximum amount of schooling. If g < r,
the agent chooses no schooling. If g = r, the agent is indierent to all levels of schooling. Thus, for our analysis to
apply to the Mincer earnings equation, we have to assume that choices involve some combination of psychic costs,
tuition, uncertainty or the like. The model of Keane and Wolpin (1997) is one of many frameworks that would justify
an unordered choice model but could be consistent with a Mincer earnings equation. See Heckman, Lochner, and
Todd (2006). We thank the referee for emphasizing this point to us.
31Decomposition (16) for an ordered choice model is presented in Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) and Heck-
man and Vytlacil (2007b).
32Alternatively, one can make functional form assumptions about the distribution of the error terms.
33See the conditions in footnote 22.
16Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) show that if one augments the IV assumptions with the same
identication at innity assumptions used in structural models, one can use IV in the limit to
identify the components of (3.5). In the limit sets, one can identify
E(Y1   Y2jR1(z1) = R2(z2)) (17)
and
E(Y1   Y3jR1(z1) = R3(z3)) (18)
by setting Z3 and Z2 respectively to limit set values. Essentially one can use the limit sets to make
a three choice model into a two choice model, and the standard results for the two choice model
apply.34 Under these assumptions, and additional mild regularity assumptions, using structural
methods, one can identify the distributions of (Y1;Y2) and (Y1;Y3) so that one can identify distri-
butions of treatment eects, Y2   Y1 and Y3   Y1, in addition to the mean parameters identied
by IV.35 One can also identify the proportion of people induced into 1 from each alternative state
using variation in the instrument.
Consider the model with the parameters presented in Table 1. This is a discrete choice model
with associated outcome variables. The Zj;j = 1;:::;3, are assumed to be scalar and mutually
independent. They are normally distributed so they satisfy large support (\identication at inn-
ity") conditions. Table 2 shows how a change in Z1, which increases it by .75 standard deviations,
shifts people across categories. This corresponds to making GED attainment easier.36 The esti-
mates reported in Table 2 can be obtained from a structural discrete choice model. The percentage
initially in 1 (GED) increases from 33.17% to 38.8%. The percentage in 2 (dropout) decreases from
29.11% to 25.91%. The percentage in 3 (graduating high school) declines from 37.72% to 35.29%.
The IV estimate is -.032. (See the base of Table 3) This is the only number produced by an IV
analysis using Z1 as an instrument that changes within the specied range. The structural analysis
in Table 3 shows that the net eect produced by the change in Z1 is composed of 2 terms. It arises
from a gain of .199 for the switchers 2 ! 1 (dropout to GED) and a loss of .336 (3 ! 1) (graduate
34See Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b)
35The literature on \quantile treatment eects" uses IV to identify the quantiles of Y1 and Y2 separately but not
the quantiles of Y1   Y2. See Abbring and Heckman (2007).
36Heckman, LaFontaine, and Rodr guez (2008) show that easing GED requirements promotes dropping out of
school and causes some dropouts to become GEDs.
17to GED).
Figure 1 shows what can be identied from the structural model. It plots the distributions of
gains for persons going from 2 to 1 and from 3 to 1 as well as the overall distribution of gains to
the switchers. Persons switching from 3 to 1 are harmed in gross terms by the policy that changes
Z1, while those who switch from 2 to 1 gain in gross terms. In utility terms, (Rj), people are
better o.37 In terms of gross gains, about 56.8% of the people who switch from 2 to 1 are better
o while 39.3% of the people who switch from 3 to 1 are better o. Overall, 49.2% are better o
in gross terms even though the IV estimate is slightly negative. If one seeks to understand the
distributional eects of the policy associated with a change Z1, the structural analysis is clearly
much more revealing. The IV estimate, which is a mean gross gain aggregating over origin states,
does not capture the rich information about choices aorded by a structural analysis. However, it
does identify the average gain to the program compared to the next-best alternatives. If that is
the object of interest, linear IV is the right tool to use.
6 Summary and Discussion
The choice between using IV or a more structural approach for a particular problem should be
made on the basis of Marschak's Maxim: use minimal assumptions to answer well-posed economic
questions. Most IV studies do not clearly formulate the economic question being answered by the
IV analysis. The probability limit of the IV estimator is dened to be the object of interest. In
the binary outcome case, even if Z is a valid instrument, if Z is a vector, and analysts use only one
component of the vector as an instrument, and do not condition on the other components of Z,
the weights on the MTE can be negative over certain ranges. The practice of not conditioning on
the other instruments is common in the literature.38 In this case, IV can estimate the wrong sign
for the true causal eect.39 Recent analyses show how to improve on this practice and to design
functions of standard instrumental variables that answer classes of well-posed economic questions.40
We have discussed a model with three or more choices where there is no particular order among
the choices. Such examples arise routinely in applied economics. In this case, under conditions
37This is imposed in a discrete choice model.
38See e.g. Card (2001).
39See Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006).
40See Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, 2007b).
18specied in this paper, IV estimates a weighted average of the mean gross gain to persons induced
into a choice state by a change in the instrument (policy) compared to their next best alterna-
tive.41 It averages the returns to a destination state over all origin states. It does not produce the
distribution of gains overall or by each origin state. Again, as in the binary choice case, for vector
Z, using one component of Z as an instrument, and not conditioning on the other components can
produce negative weights so that the sign of an IV can be opposite to that of the true causal eect
which can be identied by a structural analysis.
Structural methods provide a more complete description of the eect of the instrument or the
policy associated with the instrument. They identify mean returns as well as distributions of returns
for agents coming to a destination state from each margin. They also identify the proportion of
people induced into a state from each origin state.
Structural methods come at a cost. Unless distributional assumptions for unobservables are
invoked, structural methods often require some form of an \identication at innity" assumption.42
However, in the general case in which responses to treatment are heterogeneous, IV requires the
same assumption if one seeks to identify average treatment eects.43 An identication at innity
assumption can be checked in any sample so it does not require imposing a priori beliefs onto the
data. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) present an example of how to test an identication at
innity assumption. See also the discussion in Abbring and Heckman (2007).44 Recent advances by
Fox and Gandhi (2008) show that in structural models generated by nite mixtures, identication at
innity is not required to establish model identication, although continuity properties on functions
and some of the regressors that constitute their arguments are required.45 Carneiro, Heckman,
and Vytlacil (2009) develop a rich class of economically interesting parameters that do not require
identication at innity and can be identied from local variation in instruments. An \identication
at innity" assumption is not intrinsic to the structural approach.
Many proponents of IV point to the strong distributional and functional form assumptions
41See Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006, 2008) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b).
42See Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a, Appendix B).
43See Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006, 2008) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b).
44However, this assumption is not yet routinely checked in many structural analyses.
45The analysis of Fox and Gandhi (2008) shows that under their conditions it is possible to identify structural models
with heterogeneity in choice equations that are ruled out by LATE-like monotonicity conditions. Thus models with
two way ows between states that result from exogenous changes in instruments can be constructed, identied and
estimated, and meaningful economic parameters can be identied without invoking \identication at innity" or
arbitrary conditions like \monotonicity" that are central to LATE.
19required to implement structural methods. They ignore recent progress in econometrics that iden-
ties and empirically implements robust semiparametric and nonparametric approaches to struc-
tural analysis.46 Recent developments respond to arguments against the use of explicit econometric
models made by a generation of applied economists that emerged in the 1980s. Those arguments
are more properly directed against 1980s versions of structural models that were based on linearity
and normality. Structural econometricians in the 21st century have listened to the critics and have
perfected their tools to response to the criticism.
The appeal to standard IV as a preferred estimator is sometimes made on the basis of \sim-
plicity and robustness". Standard IV is certainly simple to compute although problems with weak
instruments can make it empirically unstable.47 Since, in the general case, dierent instruments
identify dierent parameters, IV is not robust to the choice of instrument.48 Since the sign of an
IV can be dierent from the true causal eect, IV may even produce a misleading guide to policy
or inference, so it is not robust.
The meaning of \simplicity" is highly subjective. How simple is the economic interpretation
of IV? Certainly decomposition (14) is not simple. The fact that simple IV can estimate wrong
signs for true causal eects should give pause to those who claim that it is \robust". The weak
instrument literature cautions us against uncritical claims about the sturdiness of IV estimators.
The ability of dierent statistical estimators to answer questions of economic interest, or to show
why they cannot be answered, should drive the choice of empirical techniques for analyzing data.
Consider a worst case for structural estimation. Suppose that application of recently developed
procedures for testing for structural identication reveal that a structural model is not identied
or is only partially identied. Does this conclusion suggest that IV is a better choice for an
estimator? That disguising identication problems by a statistical procedure is preferable to an
honest discussion of the limits of the data? For underidentied structural models, it is possible to
conduct sensitivity analyses guided by economic theory to explore the consequences of ignorance
about features of the model. With IV, unaided by structural analysis, this type of exercise is not
46See e.g. Abbring and Heckman (2007), Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003), Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro
(2007), Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2006, revised 2008), Fox and Gandhi (2008) and Matzkin (1992, 1993,
2007). These recent developments in robust structural modeling have not yet made their way into widespread use in
empirical structural analysis.
47See e.g. Stock and Staiger (1997) and the ensuing large literature on weak instruments.
48See Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006).
20possible. Problems of identication and interpretation are swept under the rug and replaced by
\an eect" identied by IV that is often very dicult to interpret as an answer to an interesting
economic question.
21A Derivation of the Standard IV Estimator
We rst study the numerator of IV
Z1 in the text. Recall that we keep the conditioning on X implicit.
Using ~ Z1 = Z1    Z1,
Cov(Y;Z1) = E

~ Z1 (Y1D1 + Y2D2 + Y3D3)

:
Using D1 = 1   D2   D3, we obtain
Cov(Y;Z1) = E




















= 0. It is natural to decompose this expression using choice \1" as the base,
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fY2 Y1;V2 V1;V2 V3(y2   y1;v2   v1;v2   v3)d(v2   v3) d(v2   v1) d(y2   y1)
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fY3 Y1;V3 V1;V3 V2 (y3   y1;v3   v1;v3   v2) d(v3   v2) d(v3   v1) d(y3   y1)
!
 f ~ Z1;#3(Z3) #1(Z1);#3(Z3) #2(Z2) (~ z1;#3 (z3)   #1 (z1);#3 (z3)   #2 (z2)) d(#3 (z3)   #2 (z2)) d(#3 (z3)   #1 (z1)) d~ z1:





















d(#2 (z2)   #3 (z3)) d(v2   v1): (19)
hV2 V1;V2 V3(:) is the joint density of V2 V1, V2 V3. Dene the weighting term in braces in (19) as
#2(Z2) #3(Z3);V2 V1(#2 (z2) #3 (z3);v2 v1). It is necessary to x both #2 (z2) #3 (z3) and v2 v1
in forming the weight. This weight can be estimated from a structural discrete choice analysis and
the joint distribution of (Z;D1;D2;D3). The terms multiplying the weight are marginal treatment
eects generalized to the unordered case. (A.1) cannot be decomposed using IV. An alternative
representation of the term in braces, #2(Z2) #3(Z3);V2 V1(#2 (z2)   #3 (z3);v2   v1) is
#2(Z2) #3(Z3);V2 V1 (#2 (z2)   #3 (z3);v2   v1) =
E (Z1   E (Z1) j #2 (Z2)   #3 (Z3) = #2 (z2)   #3 (z3);#2 (Z2)   #1 (Z1)  v2   v1)
 Pr(#2 (Z2)   #3 (Z3) = #2 (z2)   #3 (z3);#2 (Z2)   #1 (Z1)  v2   v1):





















d(#3 (z3)   #2 (z2)) d(v3   v1): (20)
Dene the term in braces in (20) as the weight #3(Z3) #2(Z2);V3 V1(#3 (z3)   #2 (z2);v3   v1).
23To obtain the denominator for the IV, recall that S =
P3
j=1 j Dj. Substitute D1 = 1 D2 D3,
3 X
j=1
j Dj = (1   D2   D3) + 2D2 + 3D3
= 1 + D2 + 2D3:
Then















~ Z1 (1(R3  R1;R3  R2))

:
Using reasoning similar to that invoked for the analysis of the numerator terms, we obtain expres-















hV2 V1;V2 V3 (v2   v1;v2   v3) d(v2   v3)
!
d(v2   v1)
d(#2 (z2)   #3 (z3))d(#2 (z2)   #1 (z1))
#
d~ z1: (22)















f ~ Z1;#2(Z2) #1(Z1);#2(Z2) #3(Z3) (~ z1;#2 (z2)   #1 (z1);#2 (z2)   #3 (z3))
d(#2 (z2)   #1 (z1))
!
d(#2 (z2)   #3 (z3))
#






#2(Z2) #3(Z3);V2 V1(#2 (z2)   #3 (z3);v2   v1)d(v2   v1) d(#2 (z2)   #3 (z3)):
















f ~ Z1;#3(Z3) #1(Z1);#3(Z3) #2(Z2) (~ z1;#3 (z3)   #1 (z1);#3 (z3)   #2 (z2))d(#3 (z3)   #1 (z1))
!
d(#3 (z3)   #2 (z2))
#






#3(Z3) #2(Z2);V3 V1 (#3 (z3)   #2 (z2);v3   v1) d(v3   v1) d(#3 (z3)   #2 (z2)):
These terms can be identied from a structural analysis using the joint distribution of (Z;D1;D2;D3).
Collecting results, we obtain decomposition (14) in the text if we multiply both the numerator and
denominator by -1.
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30Table 1. Potential Outcomes, Choice Model and Parameterizations
Outcomes Choice Model








j2J YjDj Rj = jZj   Vj with j 2 J
Parameterization











0:64 0:16 0:16 0:024  0:32 0:016
0:16 1 0:20 0:020  0:30 0:010
0:16 0:20 1 0:020  0:40 0:040
0:024 0:020 0:020 1 0:6 0100
 0:32  0:30  0:40 0:6 1 0:2































= [ 0:2 0:3 0:1 ]
31Table 2. Transition Matrix Obtained from the Change in the Instrument Z1
The Instrument Increases by 0.75 Standard Deviation
New Value of Instrument
(e Z = Z1 + 0:75)
D1 = 1 D2 = 1 D3 = 1 Total
Original Value D1 = 1 33.17% 0% 0% 33.17%
of Instrument D2 = 1 3.20% 25.91% 0% 29.11%
(Z1) D3 = 1 2.43% 0% 35.29% 37.72%
Total 38.80% 25.91% 35.29% 100%
32Table 3. Marginal Gains Identied from the Change in the Instrument Z1
The Instrument Increases by 0.75 Standard Deviation
Gains to Switchers Fraction of Population Switching
From 2 to 1 0.199 3.20%
From 3 to 1 -0.336 2.43%






  E [Y jZ1] = 3:20
3:20+2:43  0:199   2:43
3:20+2:43  0:336 =  0:032
33Figure 1. Distribution of Gains in Outcomes Induced by the Change in the Instrument Z1
The Instrument Increases by 0.75 Standard Deviation
˙  Average Gain for
Switchers From 2 to 1
 Average Gain for ˙
Switchers From 3 to 1
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Difference in Outcomes
From Sector 2 to Sector 1 From Sector 3 to Sector 1 Overall Distribution
Fraction of Gross Gainers by Source
% Gross Gainers from 2 to 1 56.8%
% Gross Gainers from 3 to 1 39.3%
% Gross Gainers from all Sources 49.2%
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